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SUPREME COURT NO. _____ STATE OF WASHINGTON
COA NO. 48702-1-II

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

MARTIN O. NICKERSON, JR.,

Petitioner,

v.

WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, et al.,

Respondents.

FILED
COURT OF APPEALS DIV I
STATE OF WASHINGTON
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FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR THURSTON COUNTY

The Honorable Carol Murphy, Judge

PETITION FOR REVIEW

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A. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER AND COURT OF APPEALS
OPINION TO BE REVIEWED

Martin O. Nickerson, Jr., plaintiff and appellant below, petitions this Court to review the unpublished opinion in *Nickerson v. Washington State Department of Revenue*, Court of Appeals No. 48702-1-II (Nov. 8, 2016). The Court issued an Order Denying Motion to Publish December 6, 2016.¹

B. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Under the Supremacy Clause, does the federal Controlled Substances Act pre-empt the State from creating a commercial marijuana market by applying business taxes to non-commercial collective gardens for medical marijuana patients? U.S. Const., Art. VI; RAP 13.4(b)(1), (3), (4).

2. Does the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination prevent the State from compelling a medical marijuana collective garden operator to file tax returns reporting the collective garden's income in order to challenge imputed assessments of business taxes, when the State simultaneously is prosecuting him for criminally possessing and delivering marijuana and

¹ The Slip Opinion and Order Denying Motion to Publish are attached as App. A.

the returns are available to law enforcement? U.S. Const., Amend. V; RAP 13.4(b)(1), (3).

C. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801-904 ("CSA"), makes any possession or use of marijuana criminal. In 1971, the Washington Legislature enacted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, RCW chapter 69.50. Like the CSA, this statute makes it a crime to manufacture, deliver, and possess marijuana. RCW 69.50.401-.445. *Cannabis Action Coalition v. City of Kent*, 183 Wn.2d 219, 222-23, 351 P.3d 1515 (2015).

In 1998, the People of the State of Washington passed Initiative 692 -- the Medical Use of Cannabis Act (MUCA). LAWS OF 1999, ch. 2; *id.*

In 2011, the Legislature passed amendments to the MUCA, RCW Ch. 69.51A, to create a regulated, licensed system for wholesaling and retailing medical marijuana, as well as permitting "collective gardens" for qualifying medical marijuana patients. ESSSB 5073 (2011).

Petitioner Martin Nickerson applied for a general business retail license for a non-profit collective garden. He acknowledged his ownership

of Northern Cross Collective Gardens and its purpose to provide medical marijuana. CP 93-100.

Governor Gregoire ultimately vetoed those sections of the 2011 amendments that would "authorize and license commercial businesses that produce, process or dispense cannabis." Veto Message on E2SSB 5073 (2011). She signed into law permission for collective gardens among qualifying patients and their care providers, former RCW 69.51A.085; and left intact:

Nothing in this chapter or in the rules adopted to implement it precludes a qualifying patient or designated provider from engaging in the private, unlicensed, noncommercial production, possession, transportation, delivery, or administration of cannabis for medical use as authorized under RCW 69.51A.040.

Former RCW 69.51A.025;² LAWS OF 2011, ch. 181, § 413.

Nonetheless, DOR imposed sales and B&O taxes on retail sales of medical marijuana, including "providing for donations, etc." Despite the Governor's veto of retail medical marijuana provisions, DOR deemed collective gardens to be retail businesses. CP 39-42.

² This section was repealed by LAWS OF 2015, ch. 70, § 48(2), effective 7/24/15.

RCW 82.32.330³ permits DOR to provide business tax returns to the U.S. Department of Justice, as well as county prosecutors with a subpoena, search warrant, or other court order.

In 2012, the State charged Mr. Nickerson with multiple felonies related to possessing and delivering marijuana, including conspiracy, alleged to have occurred September, 2011 - March, 2012. CP 29, 34-37. While these charges were pending, DOR assessed taxes totaling over \$55,000 against Mr. Nickerson and Northern Cross for the same timespan, based on income DOR imputed with no known source of information. DOR offered to correct the assessments according to actual sales when Mr. Nickerson filed tax returns reporting the collective garden's gross business income for 2011-2012. CP 88-90, 102-03.

Due to the pending criminal charges, petitioner asserted his Fifth Amendment protection from self-incrimination against filing a return to report actual income from the collective garden. CP 28-31. The prosecution could use such a statement with his business license application to

³ The relevant text is attached in App. B.

establish that he had in fact possessed and delivered marijuana, an essential element of the criminal charges.

DOR issued tax warrants and seized Mr. Nickerson's bank account (\$824.23). CP 30-32, 46-49, 51, 88-90, 105-08. When no returns were filed and the tax remained not fully paid, DOR revoked his business licenses. CP 90, 118-19. Operating a business with a revoked license is a felony. RCW 82.32.290(2).

Mr. Nickerson sued for an injunction to prevent DOR from assessing and collecting the imputed taxes. He also argued the federal Controlled Substances Act pre-empted the State's system of imposing sales and business taxes on collective gardens. By converting a collective garden to a retail business and assessing taxes on all transfers of the medicine among qualifying patients, the State of Washington created a business market, in direct conflict with and an obstacle to the CSA's purpose of preventing any market or use of marijuana. CP 4-18, 19-27, 161-70; RP(2/20/15, 3/20/15, 5/15/15).

On cross motions for judgment on the pleadings, the superior court denied the injunction and dismissed the action. CP 248-53.

The Court of Appeals affirmed. It held the CSA's purpose was to "control the distribution, dispensing, and possession of classified drugs," rather than to preclude any market in marijuana, and so DOR's collection of taxes on a collective garden's "sales" of medical marijuana was not an obstacle to the CSA. Slip Op. at 10-11.

It further held that reporting gross income from the collective garden was not incriminating, because "Nickerson needed to provide only sales totals and information about where the sales took place in order to complete his return. The return did not ask Nickerson to identify what he sold." It then concluded the business application listing Northern Gardens as a medical marijuana collective garden (thus identifying "what he sold,") "was a legal activity under the MUCA," and so was not incriminating. Slip Op. at 14-15.

D. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS OPINION THAT THE CSA DOES NOT PREEMPT DOR FROM CONVERTING NON-COMMERCIAL COLLECTIVE GARDENS INTO A RETAIL MARKET FOR MARIJUANA CONFLICTS WITH SUPREME COURT OPINIONS, PRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, AND A SUBSTANTIAL ISSUE OF PUBLIC IMPORTANCE. RAP 13.4(b)(1), (3), (4).

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land ..., any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

United States Constitution, Article VI.

The Court of Appeals properly interpreted that a state law is preempted when it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Slip Op. at 8. To the extent a state statute authorizes or permits what a federal statute prohibits, it is pre-empted "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." *Michigan Cannery & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining Bd.*, 467 U.S. 461, 478 & n.21, 104 S. Ct. 2518, 81 L. Ed. 2d 399 (1984). "The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone" in every pre-emption case. *Altria Group, Inc. v. Good*, 555 U.S. 70, 76-77, 129 S. Ct. 538, 172 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2008).

Here the Court of Appeals misinterpreted Congress's purpose regarding marijuana.

- a. *The CSA's Intent is to Preclude Any Market, Illegal or Legal, in Marijuana.*

The Court of Appeals interpreted the purpose of the CSA too broadly for purposes of this case. The statute's overall purpose may be to "control the supply and demand of controlled substances in both lawful and unlawful drug markets," Slip Op. at 10. But here the question is limited to marijuana.

Since Congress enacted the CSA in 1970, marijuana and tetrahydrocannabinols have been classified as Schedule I controlled substances.⁴ Schedule I drugs are deemed to have "a high potential for abuse," "no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States" and "a lack of accepted safety for use ... under medical supervision." 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(A)-(C). **By classifying marijuana as a Schedule I drug, Congress mandated that the manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuana be a criminal offense.**⁵

United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483, 489-90, 492, 121 S. Ct.

⁴ See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 202, 4 Stat. 1249 (Schedule I(c)(10) and (17)); 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (Schedule I(c)(10) and (17)).

⁵ The sole exception is use of the drug as part of a federally approved research study. 21 U.S.C. §§ 823, 841(a)(1), 844(a).

1711, 149 L. Ed. 2d 722 (2001) (emphasis added). Thus the federal statute's purpose is not merely to control, but to prevent any market, legal or illegal, in marijuana.

b. *DOR's Application of General Business Tax Laws to the Noncommercial Function of Collective Gardens is Preempted by the Controlled Substances Act.*

The MUCA permitted noncommercial provision of medical marijuana. Former RCW 69.51A.085,⁶ 69.51A.025, *supra*. The Court of Appeals erroneously concluded taxation did not change the nature of providing marijuana in a collective garden. Slip Op. at 10. But by imposing sales and B&O taxes on "producing, processing, transporting and delivering" medical cannabis in a collective garden, DOR converted these private, noncommercial activities into a commercial market.⁷ It required that the collective garden function as a business,

⁶ The statute's text is in App. B.

⁷ A similar noncommercial entity is a community pea patch. Various people may have specific plots to plant. They may combine efforts: one providing fertilizer, another hoeing weeds when others are unable, helping harvest. They may provide each other fresh produce in exchange for these shared efforts. This activity does not convert the pea patch into a commercial enterprise to which state business excise taxes apply.

that it quantify each participant's contributions, even non-monetary, and collect sales taxes from its qualifying patient or designated provider participants. DOR thus created, participated in and benefitted from this market. It is this application of the law, creating a commercial market, that is preempted by the CSA.

Creating, participating in and benefitting from a commercial market in marijuana is an obstacle to the CSA's purpose to preclude any supply or demand for marijuana. It thus is preempted by the federal law. U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.

c. *The Relationship Between the Federal CSA and State Marijuana Laws is an Issue of Substantial Public Importance that Should Be Determined by the Supreme Court.*

The conflict between the CSA and state laws legalizing marijuana presents a substantial issue of ongoing public importance.

In 2013, the voters passed Initiative 502, a system for licensing and taxing producers, processors, and retailers of recreational

marijuana. See RCW 69.50.535 (excise taxes on each retail sale of marijuana).⁷

In 2015, the Legislature again enacted the bulk of what Governor Gregoire vetoed in 2011: commercial licensing for the manufacture, processing, wholesale and retail sales of medical marijuana; and a "secure and confidential medical marijuana authorization database." LAWS OF 2015, ch. 70; SB 5052 (2015). Under the 2015 amendments, RCW 82.04.404 specifically exempts medical marijuana from business and occupational taxes effective July 1, 2016. LAWS OF 2015, ch. 70, § 40.

The outgoing Obama administration⁸ and Congress⁹ adopted a temporary non-enforcement

⁷ Although this case predates I-502 and involves only medical marijuana, DOR acknowledged the arguments apply equally to recreational marijuana. RP(5/15/15) 60. See RCW 69.50.325-.369 & .535.

⁸ See James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, *Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement* (Aug. 29, 2013) (available at www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf) (accessed 12/29/2016).

⁹ See, e.g., Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 542 ("None of the funds made available in this Act to the Department of Justice may be used ... [to prevent specified States and jurisdictions] from implementing their own laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession,

policy for state marijuana laws. But as the Ninth Circuit observed just before the recent election:

To be clear, § 542 does not provide immunity from prosecution for federal marijuana offenses. The CSA prohibits the manufacture, distribution, and possession of marijuana. Anyone in any state who possesses, distributes, or manufactures marijuana for medical or recreational purposes (or attempts or conspires to do so) is committing a federal crime. The federal government can prosecute such offenses for up to five years after they occur. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282. Congress currently restricts the government from spending certain funds to prosecute certain individuals. But Congress could restore funding tomorrow, a year from now, or four years from now, and the government could then prosecute individuals who committed offenses while the government lacked funding. . . . Nor does any state law "legalize" possession, distribution, or manufacture of marijuana. **Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, state laws cannot permit what federal law prohibits. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.2. Thus, while the CSA remains in effect, states cannot actually authorize the manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuana. Such activity remains prohibited by federal law.**

United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1179 n.5 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added); *United States v. Nixon*, 839 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 2016).

or cultivation of medical marijuana.")

The incoming administration and Congress present a very different public attitude toward such policies.¹⁰

The issue is sufficiently significant that Washington State joined Oregon as amicus curiae in *Safe Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper* (10th Cir. No. 16-1048). Plaintiffs there challenge Colorado's Amendment 64¹¹ as unlawfully legalizing marijuana cultivation, manufacture, and possession in violation of the CSA and the Supremacy Clause. Washington's Attorney General appeared there in support of the defendants. Oral argument is set for January 17, 2017.

While the MUCA statutes applied at issue here are no longer in force, this Court's decision would provide guidance for how the CSA affects MUCA's successor statutes.

¹⁰ President-Elect Trump's nominee for Attorney General, Senator Jefferson Beauregard Sessions, said last year in a Senate hearing: "We need grown-ups in charge in Washington to say marijuana is not the kind of thing that ought to be legalized, it ought not to be minimized, that it's in fact a very real danger." Christopher Ingram, *"Trump's pick for attorney general: 'Good people don't smoke marijuana,'"* Washington Post (Nov. 18, 2016).

¹¹ Colorado Const. Art. XVIII, § 16.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS OPINION DENYING MR. NICKERSON'S FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE CONFLICTS WITH DECISIONS BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND PRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION. RAP 13.4(b)(1), (3).

No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law

United States Constitution, Amendment V. This provision applies to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment. *Malloy v. Hogan*, 378 U.S. 1, 8, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964).

The Court of Appeals properly acknowledged

The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction under a ... criminal statute but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a ... crime.

Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87, 71 S. Ct. 814, 95 L. Ed. 1118 (1951); Slip Op. at 12. Nonetheless, its conclusion that the tax return required in this case does not furnish such a link conflicts with established Supreme Court precedent.

a. *The Court of Appeals Opinion Conflicts with Well Established Supreme Court Fifth Amendment Precedent.*

This case is controlled by: *United States v. Sullivan*, 274 U.S. 259, 47 S. Ct. 607, 71 L. Ed.

1037 (1927); *Marchetti v. United States*, 390 U.S. 39, 88 S. Ct. 697, 19 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); *Grosso v. United States*, 390 U.S. 62, 88 S. Ct. 709, 19 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1968); *Haynes v. United States*, 390 U.S. 85, 88 S. Ct. 722, 19 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1968); and *Leary v. United States*, 395 U.S. 6, 89 S. Ct. 1532, 23 L. Ed. 2d 57 (1969).

Sullivan held a general personal income tax return was not incriminatory. Although the taxpayer made his income illegally, filing the return did not identify the source of his income. In contrast, the business tax return required here is directly based on the business license. It requires the business registration number, which in turn identifies the source of any business income as providing marijuana. CP 97-100, 121-23. DOR acknowledged it was only assessing taxes for income obtained from medical marijuana, the same conduct with which the State criminally charged Mr. Nickerson. CP 251-53; RP(5/15/15) at 30-31.

Marchetti, *Haynes*, and *Leary*, in contrast, addressed specific taxes imposed solely on criminal sources of income, at a time when those returns were readily available to law enforcement. In *Marchetti*, the Court held the Fifth Amendment

privilege was a complete defense to charges of failing to register a wagering business and failing to pay taxes on it. Unlike the return required in *Sullivan*, where "most of the return's questions would not have compelled the taxpayer to make incriminating disclosures," the anti-wagering statute made every element of the registration and tax return incriminating. *Id.* at 50-51.

The Constitution of course obliges this Court to give full recognition to the taxing powers and to measures reasonably incidental to their exercise. But we are equally obliged to give full effect to the constitutional restrictions which attend the exercise of those powers. We do not, as we have said, doubt Congress' power to tax activities which are, wholly or in part, unlawful.

...

The terms of the wagering tax system make quite plain that Congress intended information obtained as a consequence of registration and payment of the occupational tax to be provided to interested prosecuting authorities. See 26 U.S.C. § 6107. This has evidently been the consistent practice of the Revenue Service.

Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 58-59.

In response to the government's argument that the defendant had no "constitutional right to gamble," the Court noted:

The question is not whether petitioner holds a "right" to violate state law, but whether, having done so, he may be

compelled to give evidence against himself.

Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 51.

In *Leary*, a federal marijuana tax act required a special tax on anyone "dealing in" marijuana and made the tax information readily available to law enforcement. *Leary*, 395 U.S. at 16. The Supreme Court held in *Marchetti*, *Haynes*, and *Leary*, making this information available to law enforcement created "'real and appreciable,' and not merely 'imaginary and unsubstantial,' hazards of self-incrimination." *Marchetti*, 390 U.S. at 48.

Although the general business tax statutes here are not limited to marijuana transactions, nonetheless combined with the information in the linked business license application, it is clear any statement of gross income would admit Mr. Nickerson received income from providing medical marijuana -- necessarily admitting he possessed and delivered marijuana, essential elements the State would have to prove in the pending criminal charges.

Furthermore, IRS tax returns now are protected from distribution to law enforcement, while state excise tax returns are available to state and

federal law enforcement. Thus in *United States v. Appoloney*, 761 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1985), the court held a statutory requirement to file a federal wagering tax return does not violate the Fifth Amendment because the federal statutes (amended after *Leary* and *Marchetti*) now prohibit the IRS from disclosing the information to law enforcement. Without that protection, Mr. Nickerson faces a real and appreciable risk of incrimination, under state and federal law, if he files a return admitting he received income in his "business" of a medical marijuana collective garden.

b. *The Appellate Court's Interpretation of Lawful Activity Did Not Resolve Criminal Charges Against Mr. Nickerson.*

The Court of Appeals conclusion that Northern Cross Collective Gardens' business application is not incriminating because the "collective garden" "was a legal activity under the MUCA" does not end the relevant inquiry.

Obviously, the Whatcom County Prosecuting Attorney did not agree with this interpretation, filing multiple felony charges against Mr. Nickerson for possession, possession with intent to deliver, delivery, and conspiracy to deliver

marijuana. CP 29, 34-37. Those charges remain pending in Whatcom County Superior Court.

To prove these charges, the State would have to prove the essential element that petitioner possessed and delivered marijuana. Filing the required tax return stating gross receipts for the collective garden would admit Mr. Nickerson possessed and delivered marijuana -- the only business purpose listed in the registration for Northern Cross Collective Gardens. CP 97-100.

If the county prosecutor can interpret petitioner's activity as criminal, even more so can the United States Attorney. Even the Court of Appeals acknowledged federal authorities "are free to enforce the CSA in an effort to effectuate the purposes and objectives of the law." Slip Op. at 11.

There is no dispute the collective garden was not legal activity under federal law. DOR imputed income and assessed taxes for the business through September 30, 2013. The five-year federal statute of limitations thus leaves exposure until September 30, 2018. 18 U.S.C. § 3282. For conspiracy, the statute begins to run upon the last over act,


allowing the Government to go back in time so long as the alleged conspiracy existed.


E. CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals opinion conflicts with opinions of the Supreme Court and the case presents significant issues regarding the constitutional supremacy clause and the interaction between federal and state marijuana laws. Many states across the country are enacting some form of making marijuana available, despite the CSA. In Washington, the voters themselves passed such laws, indicating their broad public interest for the topic. This Court should decide these crucial issues to provide guidance for the future. RAP 13.4(b)(1), (3), (4).

DATED this 5th day of January, 2017.

Respectfully submitted,


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APPENDIX A

Court of Appeals Opinion, No. 48702-1-II
(November 8, 2016)

Order Denying Motion to Publish,
(December 6, 2016)

November 8, 2016

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

MARTIN O. NICKERSON, JR.,

Appellant,

v.

WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF
REVENUE, GOVERNOR JAY INSLEE,
Washington State Governor (in his official
capacity), WASHINGTON ATTORNEY
GENERAL BOB FERGURSON, (in his
official capacity), CAROL NELSON, Director
of Washington State Department of Revenue,
(in her official capacity), and JOHN AND
JANE DOES 1-10,

Respondents.

No. 48702-1-II

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MAXA, A.C.J. – Martin Nickerson appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment and grant of summary judgment in favor of the Department of Revenue (DOR).¹ Nickerson sued to enjoin DOR from collecting retail sales taxes and business and operating (B&O) taxes after DOR assessed taxes against him and a business entity he owned based on his operation of a medical marijuana collective garden.

Nickerson claims that imposition of the retail sales and B&O taxes violates two provisions of the United States Constitution – the Supremacy Clause and the Fifth Amendment.

¹ In addition to DOR, Nickerson named as defendants Governor Jay Inslee, Attorney General Bob Ferguson, Director of DOR Carol Nelson, and unidentified employees of DOR. We refer to all defendants collectively as “DOR.”

No. 48702-1-II

Specifically, Nickerson argues that the trial court erred in denying his injunction because (1) DOR's attempt to collect taxes on retail sales of medical marijuana is preempted by the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971; and (2) requiring that he file tax returns and pay taxes on medical marijuana sales would violate his right against self-incrimination by providing the State with evidence it could use against him in his pending criminal prosecution for possession and delivery of marijuana.

We hold that (1) the CSA does not preempt DOR's collection of retail and B&O taxes for medical marijuana sales because such tax collection does not create a positive conflict with the purpose of the CSA as required for preemption under 21 U.S.C. § 903, and (2) filing tax returns and paying retail sales and B&O taxes does not violate Nickerson's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination because those actions do not require Nickerson to divulge any incriminating information.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of Nickerson's summary judgment motion and its grant of summary judgment in favor of DOR.

FACTS

In 2011, the legislature passed Engrossed Second Substitute Senate Bill (ESSSB) 5073 to address medical marijuana. Among other things, the bill allowed wholesale and retail sales of medical marijuana by licensed producers and dispensers. The governor signed ESSSB 5073 into law only after vetoing many sections, including the sections allowing the retail sale of medical marijuana. But the final law still allowed "noncommercial production, possession, transportation, delivery, or administration of cannabis for medical use" and the operation of "collective gardens," described as "qualifying patients sharing responsibility for acquiring and

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supplying the resources required to produce and process cannabis for medical use.” Former RCW 69.51A.025, .085(2) (2011). The law became known as the Washington State Medical Use of Cannabis Act (MUCA).

On March 8, 2011, Nickerson filed a master business application as a sole proprietor (doing business as “Northern Cross”) and listed his business as selling “skin products, hemp products, soaps.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 93, 95. On February 23, 2012, Nickerson filed a second master business application for a corporation called “Northern Cross Collective Gardens” and listed “collective garden” as its principal product or service. CP at 97, 99. Nickerson also indicated that Northern Cross Collective Gardens was a retail business with an estimated gross annual income over \$100,001. Nickerson checked the box for tax registration on both applications. However, neither he nor his business ever filed tax returns or paid taxes.

In May 2011 – after the governor signed ESSSB 5073 into law but before the law took effect – DOR released a notice that medical marijuana sales would be subject to retail sales taxes and B&O taxes.

On April 2, 2012, the State charged Nickerson with multiple felony counts for delivery of marijuana, possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, and maintaining a place for controlled substances.

On November 13, 2013, DOR assessed taxes against Nickerson and Northern Cross for the years 2011-2013 and against Northern Cross Collective Gardens for the years 2011-2012, but indicated that the amounts would be amended when Nickerson filed tax returns showing actual sales totals. Nickerson did not pay the taxes or respond to DOR, and on December 30 DOR issued tax warrants for unpaid taxes in the amount of \$7,152.66 for Nickerson and \$55,016.95

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for Northern Cross Collective Gardens. DOR then filed the warrants in superior court and obtained judgments against Nickerson and Northern Cross Collective Gardens.

DOR pursued collection of the unpaid taxes and garnished \$824.23 from Nickerson's bank account. DOR also revoked the business registrations for Nickerson and Northern Cross Collective Gardens.

On January 8, 2014, Nickerson filed a tax appeal petition with DOR. DOR dismissed the petition as untimely because it was not filed within 30 days of the assessment.

On October 24, Nickerson filed suit against DOR, seeking declaratory relief and an injunction against enforcement of the tax assessments. Nickerson then filed a summary judgment motion, seeking declaratory relief and a permanent injunction. DOR filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court later converted to a summary judgment motion. The trial court denied Nickerson's summary judgment motion and granted DOR's summary judgment motion.

Nickerson appeals the trial court's summary judgment orders.

ANALYSIS

A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

1. Standard of Review

We review a trial court's order granting summary judgment de novo. *Keck v. Collins*, 184 Wn.2d 358, 370, 357 P.3d 1080 (2015). We review the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. *Id.* Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c); *Keck*, 184 Wn.2d at 370.

2. Tax Review and Injunctive Relief

Nickerson claims that DOR should not have imposed taxes on his collective garden activities. But RCW 82.32.150 provides that a party generally cannot contest the imposition of taxes until all taxes, penalties, and interest have been paid. Because Nickerson has not paid the assessed taxes, he cannot challenge the imposition of retail sales and B&O taxes under Washington law. *See AOL, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue*, 149 Wn. App. 533, 547, 205 P.3d 159 (2009). In other words, in this action he cannot make any statutory arguments about the applicability of the tax code to his particular business and sales.

RCW 82.32.150 also states that a trial court cannot restrain or enjoin the collection of any tax, but provides an exception for when assessment of a tax violates the United States Constitution or Washington Constitution. Therefore, a party may challenge tax assessments on constitutional grounds and seek injunctive relief even if the taxes have not been paid. *AOL*, 149 Wn. App. at 547. Nickerson falls within this exception because he claims that the taxes violated the United States Constitution.²

3. Washington Retail and B&O Taxes

RCW 82.08.020(1)(a)³ states that retail sales tax applies to “each retail sale” of “[t]angible personal property, unless the sale is specifically excluded from the RCW 82.04.050

² Nickerson also states that the taxes violate his right against self-incrimination under article 1, section 9 of the Washington Constitution, but his briefs focus exclusively on case law related to the Fifth Amendment. In any event, the Washington Constitution does not provide any greater protection than the Fifth Amendment. *See State v. Mendes*, 180 Wn.2d 188, 194, 322 P.3d 791 (2014), *cert. denied*, 135 S. Ct. 1718 (2015).

³ RCW 82.08.020 has been amended since the events of this case transpired. See LAWS OF 2014, ch. 140, § 12. However, these amendments do not impact the statutory language relied on by this court. Accordingly, we do not include the word “former” before RCW 82.08.020.

definition of retail sale.” None of the exclusions in RCW 82.04.050⁴ apply to medical marijuana. A retail sale is defined as “every sale of tangible personal property . . . to all persons irrespective of the nature of their business.” RCW 82.04.050(1)(a). The definition does not distinguish between legal and illegal sales.

RCW 82.04.220 requires those who make retail sales to pay retailing B&O tax on the gross proceeds of the sales made by their businesses. “ ‘Gross proceeds of sales’ means the value proceeding or accruing from the sale of tangible personal property” without deductions for costs and expenses. RCW 82.04.070. As with the definition of “retail sale,” the definition does not distinguish between legal and illegal sales.

To pay the applicable retail sales and B&O taxes, individuals or businesses must submit a combined excise tax return. The combined return requires the tax return preparer’s name and the business name and address. Required information includes the gross amount of any sales, but not the type of product being sold.

B. FEDERAL PREEMPTION

Nickerson argues that the CSA preempts DOR’s application of Washington’s tax laws to medical marijuana collective gardens.⁵ We disagree.

⁴ RCW 82.04.050 also has been amended since the events of this case transpired. See LAWS OF 2015, 3d Spec. Sess., ch. 6, § 1105. However, these amendments do not impact the statutory language relied on by this court. Accordingly, we do not include the word “former” before RCW 82.04.050.

⁵ DOR argues that Nickerson has no standing to assert the preemption argument because even if we hold that the CSA preempts MUCA as Nickerson argues in his assignment of error, he still would not be entitled to tax relief. But because Nickerson’s actual preemption argument is broader, we will assume without deciding that Nickerson has standing.

1. Legal Principles

The preemption doctrine derives from the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which provides that federal law shall be the supreme law of the land, notwithstanding the constitution or laws of any state. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; *Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett*, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2473, 186 L. Ed. 2d 607 (2013). But courts assume that the historic police powers of the states are not preempted by a federal law unless preemption was Congress's clear and manifest purpose. *Wyeth v. Levine*, 555 U.S. 555, 565, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 173 L. Ed. 2d 51 (2009). And in Washington, there is a strong presumption against finding preemption – “[p]reemption is the exception, not the rule.” *Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp.*, 151 Wn.2d 853, 864, 93 P.3d 108 (2004).

Preemption depends on Congress's intent, and Congress can preempt state law in three ways:

First, in enacting the federal law, Congress may explicitly define the extent to which it intends to pre-empt state law. Second, even in the absence of express pre-emptive language, Congress may indicate an intent to occupy an entire field of regulation, in which case the States must leave all regulatory activity in that area to the Federal Government. Finally, if Congress has not displaced state regulation entirely, it may nonetheless pre-empt state law to the extent that the state law actually conflicts with federal law.

Mich. Cannery & Freezers Ass'n v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469, 104 S. Ct. 2518, 81 L. Ed. 2d 399 (1984) (internal citations omitted). When a federal law contains an express preemption provision, “the court ‘must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.’ ” *Hue v. Farmboy Spray Co., Inc.*, 127 Wn.2d 67, 79, 896 P.2d 682 (1995) (quoting *CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood*, 507 U.S. 658, 664, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 123 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1993)).

The CSA contains an express preemption provision, which is entitled “Application of State Law”:

No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be within the authority of the State, *unless there is a positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter and that State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.*

21 U.S.C. § 903 (emphasis added). The parties agree that the language of 21 U.S.C. § 903 indicates that Congress did not intend to explicitly preempt state law or to occupy the entire field of regulation for controlled substances. Therefore, the parties agree that only the third means of preemption – conflict preemption – is at issue here.

Conflict preemption can occur when either (1) compliance with both federal and state law is impossible, or (2) state law “ ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ ” *Hillman v. Maretta*, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1950, 186 L. Ed. 2d 43 (2013) (quoting *Hines v. Davidowitz*, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S. Ct. 399, 85 L. Ed. 581 (1941)). These two types of conflict preemption are often referred to as “impossibility” and “obstacle” preemption.⁶

2. Impossibility Preemption Analysis

Courts have noted that “[i]mpossibility pre-emption is a demanding defense.” *Wyeth*, 555 U.S. at 573. Impossibility preemption asks whether it is “ ‘impossible for a private party to

⁶ DOR argues that we should consider only the impossibility standard for conflict preemption because the phrase “so that the two cannot consistently stand together” in 21 U.S.C. § 903 indicates that only conflicts making it impossible to comply with both state law and the CSA would trigger preemption. We do not need to decide this issue because Nickerson’s argument fails under both the impossibility and obstacle standards.

comply with both state and federal requirements.’ ” *PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing*, 564 U.S. 604, 618, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 180 L. Ed. 2d 580 (2011) (quoting *Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick*, 514 U.S. 280, 287, 115 S. Ct. 1483, 131 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1995)). It is met when state law requires that which federal law forbids or vice versa. *Mut. Pharmaceutical*, 133 S. Ct. at 2476-77.

Nickerson cannot meet the requirements of impossibility preemption here because he cannot show that Washington law requires him to violate federal law. DOR assessed retail sales and B&O taxes against Nickerson for his collective garden’s “sales” of medical marijuana. Under Washington law, Nickerson is required to pay applicable retail sales and B&O taxes. But Washington tax law does not compel Nickerson to engage in conduct the CSA forbids – selling marijuana.

Nickerson does not explain how paying retail sales and B&O taxes would constitute a violation of the CSA. Accordingly, we hold that impossibility preemption does not apply.

3. Obstacle Preemption Analysis

Nickerson argues that even if impossibility preemption does not apply, DOR’s taxation of collective gardens triggers obstacle preemption. “What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects.” *Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council*, 530 U.S. 363, 373, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 147 L. Ed. 2d 352 (2000). We must first consider the entire scheme of the CSA to determine its purpose and then ask whether that purpose can be accomplished or if the state law frustrates the CSA’s provisions and refuses their natural effect. *Id.*

The Supreme Court has described the “main objectives” of the CSA as “combating drug abuse and controlling the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances” by creating

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a “comprehensive, closed regulatory regime criminalizing the unauthorized manufacture, distribution, dispensing, and possession” of classified substances. *Gonzales v. Oregon*, 546 U.S. 243, 250, 126 S. Ct. 904, 163 L. Ed. 2d 748 (2006). The Court also has noted that “a primary purpose of the CSA is to control the supply and demand of controlled substances in both lawful and unlawful drug markets.” *Gonzales v. Raich*, 545 U.S. 1, 19, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 162 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005).

Nickerson argues that the DOR’s application of retail sales and B&O taxes to medical marijuana collective gardens conflicts with the purposes of the CSA. He argues that by applying retail sales and B&O taxes to collective gardens, DOR effectively “converted” a noncommercial activity into a commercial activity. But again, taxing Nickerson’s marijuana transactions does not change the nature of those transactions. Nickerson has not established that his collective garden activities would be any different if those activities were not taxed.

DOR’s tax assessments on collective gardens indicate that it is aware of the medical marijuana market, but that is not the same as promoting or condoning the market. It is well-established that states have authority to tax illegal activities. *Dep’t of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch*, 511 U.S. 767, 778, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 128 L. Ed. 2d 767 (1994). DOR’s tax assessments did not *cause* Nickerson to grow, possess, and distribute medical marijuana. Rather, DOR imposed taxes on Nickerson *because* he had distributed medical marijuana in exchange for other items of value. The taxes came after the fact.

In addition, the CSA is concerned with the supply and demand of classified drugs and therefore seeks to control the “distribution, dispensing, and possession” of classified drugs. *Gonzales*, 546 U.S. at 250. It is hard to see how the DOR’s tax assessments would disturb the

CSA's ability to regulate the distribution, dispensing, or possession of marijuana. Further, DOR's tax assessments do not impede federal prosecution for CSA violations. Federal authorities are free to enforce the CSA in an effort to effectuate the purposes and objectives of the law – to control drug trafficking and the supply and demand for classified drugs.

Accordingly, we hold that DOR's application of retail sales and B&O taxes to collective gardens' "sales" of medical marijuana does not create an obstacle to the execution of the full purposes and objectives of the CSA.

4. Summary

Because DOR's application of the retail sales and B&O taxes to the "sale" of medical marijuana through collective gardens does not create a "positive conflict" with the CSA as required in 21 U.S.C. § 903, these taxes are not preempted and do not violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Accordingly, Nickerson fails to show he is entitled to an injunction on this basis.

C. FIFTH AMENDMENT CLAIM

Nickerson argues that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination would be violated if he was required to file a tax return showing his gross income from the collective garden and to pay taxes on that income. We disagree.

1. Legal Principles

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which was made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V; *Chavez v. Martinez*, 538 U.S. 760, 766, 123 S. Ct. 1994, 155 L. Ed. 2d 984 (2003). Only communication that is

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testimonial, incriminating, and compelled can qualify for protection under the Fifth Amendment. *Hibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt County*, 542 U.S. 177, 189, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292 (2004).

A testimonial communication is one that explicitly or implicitly relates to a factual assertion or discloses information. *Id.* And an incriminating communication is one that the witness “ ‘reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used.’ ” *Id.* at 190 (quoting *Kastigar v. United States*, 406 U.S. 441, 445, 92 S. Ct. 1653, 32 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1972)).

The Fifth Amendment protection encompasses more than statements that are themselves inculpatory:

The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction under a federal criminal statute but likewise embraces those which would furnish a *link in the chain of evidence* needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime.

Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S. Ct. 814, 95 L. Ed. 1118 (1951) (emphasis added). Therefore, the scope of statements covered by the Fifth Amendment is not limited to compelled testimony that is actually used against the defendant in a criminal trial, but also includes compelled statements that provide a “link in the chain.” *United States v. Hubbell*, 530 U.S. 27, 37-38, 120 S. Ct. 2037, 147 L. Ed. 2d 24 (2000). However, “the fact that incriminating evidence may be the byproduct of obedience to a regulatory requirement, such as filing an income tax return . . . does not clothe such required conduct with the testimonial privilege.” *Id.* at 35.

2. Fifth Amendment and Taxes

In *United States v. Sullivan*, the defendant argued that filing an income tax return would violate his Fifth Amendment rights because his income derived from the illegal sale of alcohol. 274 U.S. 259, 262-64, 47 S. Ct. 607, 71 L. Ed. 1037 (1927). The tax statute at issue had broad applicability and defined gross income as income derived from any source. *Id.* at 263. The Court held that the Fifth Amendment did not offer a defense to the defendant's prosecution for willful failure to file a return because the income tax return did not compel any incriminating information. *Id.* at 263-64. The Court concluded that "[i]t would be an extreme if not an extravagant application of the Fifth Amendment to say that it authorized a man to refuse to state the amount of his income because it had been made in crime." *Id.*

In contrast, in *Marchetti v. United States* the Court upheld a Fifth Amendment argument regarding a tax system that specifically targeted those engaged in the business of illegal wagering. 390 U.S. 39, 41-44, 88 S. Ct. 697, 19 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). The tax statutes at issue in *Marchetti* required persons engaged in a wagering business to register with the Internal Revenue Service and to provide detailed information about their operations. *Id.* at 42-43. The Court noted that in all states wagering was "an area permeated with criminal statutes," making those engaged in wagering "a group inherently suspect of criminal activities." *Id.* at 47 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court held that the wagering tax statutes created a "real and appreciable, and not merely imaginary and unsubstantial" risk of self-incrimination because of the comprehensive information the statutes required from registrants. *Id.* at 48 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In *Leary v. United States*, the Court held that the defendant's invocation of his Fifth Amendment right provided a full defense to his conviction for failure to pay the transfer tax required by the "Marihuana Tax Act". 395 U.S. 6, 29, 89 S. Ct. 1532, 23 L. Ed. 2d 57 (1969). The statutes at issue were similar to those in *Marchetti* in that they provided a comprehensive scheme requiring forms for registration and payment that applied only to a specific group (those dealing in marijuana) and provided that records of compliance could be obtained by law enforcement. *Id.* at 14-15. The Court reasoned that the marijuana transfer tax imposed on the defendant a "real and appreciable risk of self-incrimination" by requiring him to identify himself "not only as a transferee of marihuana but as a transferee who had not registered and paid the occupational tax" required by law. *Id.* at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the defendant had "ample reason to fear" that complying with the transfer tax would provide a "link in a chain of evidence tending to establish his guilt" under the state marijuana laws. *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted).

3. Fifth Amendment Analysis

Nickerson argues that if he files the combined excise tax return to pay retail sales and B&O taxes, "any gross income on the tax return, combined with the business registrations, would be evidence tending to incriminate him for purposes of that criminal prosecution, as well as many federal crimes" because it would indicate that he received funds for providing marijuana. Br. of Appellant at 33. We disagree.

There are several reasons why Nickerson's payment of the retail sales and B&O tax would not create a "real and appreciable" risk of self-incrimination. First, unlike the tax statutes at issue in *Marchetti* and *Leary*, the tax statutes at issue here are generally applicable retail sales

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and B&O taxes. The taxes apply to all people and businesses that make sales within Washington without regard to what is sold. Therefore, the mere fact that Nickerson is subject to retail sales and B&O taxes does not create any suspicion of criminal activity.

Second, the combined excise tax return does not require any incriminating information. The tax returns in *Marchetti* and *Leary* essentially required the taxpayer to admit to engaging in illegal activity. But Nickerson needed to provide only sales totals and information about where the sales took place in order to complete his return. The return did not ask Nickerson to identify what he sold.

Third, Nickerson's argument that the tax return will provide a link in the chain leading to other incriminating evidence is too vague and speculative. Nickerson argues that including his tax registration number on the tax return will lead law enforcement to his business application. He argues that the tax return and business application together are evidence that he possessed and delivered marijuana. But his business application does not contain any incriminating information – it simply states that he sells skin products, hemp products, and soap. And the Northern Cross Collective Gardens' business application simply lists its business as a "collective garden," which was a legal activity under the MUCA.

Finally, at the time Nickerson filed this lawsuit he was not required to file a tax return because DOR has already obtained warrants and judgments for his unpaid taxes. At that point, Nickerson only needed to pay the judgment to satisfy DOR.

Paying generally applicable taxes assessed on legal medical marijuana sales cannot create a "real and appreciable" risk of self-incrimination. The tax return neither directly nor indirectly provides any incriminating information and Nickerson at this time does not even need to file a


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tax return. As a result, it would be an “extreme if not an extravagant application of the Fifth Amendment” to say that Nickerson cannot pay the judgment for unpaid retail sales and B&O taxes. *Sullivan*, 274 U.S. at 263-64. Therefore, we hold that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination does not apply.

CONCLUSION


DOR’s taxation of Nickerson and his business does not violate either the Supremacy Clause or the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Nickerson’s summary judgment motion and its grant of summary judgment in favor of DOR.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.




MAXA, A.C.J.

We concur:



WORSWICK, J.



MELNICK, J.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

MARTIN NICKERSON, JR,

Appellant,

v.

WASHINGTON STATE
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
et al,

Respondents.

No. 48702-1-II

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO PUBLISH

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DIVISION II
2016 DEC -6 AM 9:15
STATE OF WASHINGTON
BY [Signature]
DEPUTY

Respondents move for publication of the court's decision terminating review filed November 8, 2016, in the above-entitled matter. Upon consideration, the court denies the motion. Accordingly, it is

SO ORDERED.

DATED this 18th day of December, 2016.

PANEL: Jj. Maxa, Worswick, Melnick

FOR THE COURT:

[Signature]
ACTING CHIEF JUDGE

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APPENDIX B

(1) **Qualifying patients may create and participate in collective gardens for the purpose of producing, processing, transporting, and delivering cannabis for medical use subject to the following conditions:**

(2) For purposes of this section, the creation of a "collective garden" means qualifying patients sharing responsibility for acquiring and supplying the resources required to produce and process cannabis for medical use such as, for example, a location for a collective garden; equipment, supplies, and labor necessary to plant, grow, and harvest cannabis; cannabis plants, seeds, and cuttings; and equipment, supplies, and labor necessary for proper construction, plumbing, wiring, and ventilation of a garden of cannabis plants.

RCW 69.51A.085 (emphasis added).

RCW 82.32.330 provides in relevant part:

(2) Returns and tax information are confidential and privileged, and **except as authorized by this section**, neither the department of revenue nor any other person may disclose any return or tax information.

(3) **This section does not prohibit the department of revenue from:**

(g) **Disclosing any such return or tax information to a peace officer as defined in RCW 9A.04.110 or county prosecuting attorney, for official purposes.** The disclosure may be made only in response to a search warrant, subpoena, or other court order

(i) **Disclosing any such return or tax information to the United States department of justice . . . for official purposes;**

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DIVISION II
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STATE OF WASHINGTON
BY _____
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DECLARATION OF SERVICE

On this date, I caused a copy of the attached document to be served on the following parties by agreed electronic service, addressed as follows:

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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Washington that the above statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Jan 5, 2017-SEATTLE, WA
Date and Place

Alexandra Fast
ALEXANDRA FAST